Lets debate

Your position is that While it's true that the problem of evil concerns the individual. Why an individual suffers, experiences alienation, or lacks fulfillment, it doesn't follow that every creature must end up with what we'd call an ideally "redeemed" state for God to be truly omnibenevolent

My argument against your position is God can only allow bad states of affairs for creatures, if they are creature centric. Sin or ignorance is a bad state of affair. There are two types of evils. Negative psyche states, and ruined perceptions. An example would be like a person who is so mentally disabled, but does not experience any suffering. This is a bad state of affair, and I think if God allows ruined perception to happen to someone, then God should have good reason for allowing it in the first place. I think the best response to this would be a creature centric response. The victim of that evil will find value from the lives they endured. But if that's the case, this would also go for all bad state of affairs, including ignorance or distrust in God. And I think this collapses into universalism, since one will no longer be in a state of affair where their mind is separated from God by sin, but they will be ultimately cleansed, so they can see the good of their lives on the whole. It would be very weird to argue the life of a creature in eternal conscious torment, is as good as the life of a creature who will be in eternal bliss.

Question

Lets debate

Your position is that While it's true that the problem of evil concerns the individual. Why an individual suffers, experiences alienation, or lacks fulfillment, it doesn't follow that every creature must end up with what we'd call an ideally "redeemed" state for God to be truly omnibenevolent

My argument against your position is God can only allow bad states of affairs for creatures, if they are creature centric. Sin or ignorance is a bad state of affair. There are two types of evils. Negative psyche states, and ruined perceptions. An example would be like a person who is so mentally disabled, but does not experience any suffering. This is a bad state of affair, and I think if God allows ruined perception to happen to someone, then God should have good reason for allowing it in the first place. I think the best response to this would be a creature centric response. The victim of that evil will find value from the lives they endured. But if that's the case, this would also go for all bad state of affairs, including ignorance or distrust in God. And I think this collapses into universalism, since one will no longer be in a state of affair where their mind is separated from God by sin, but they will be ultimately cleansed, so they can see the good of their lives on the whole. It would be very weird to argue the life of a creature in eternal conscious torment, is as good as the life of a creature who will be in eternal bliss.

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

Hmmm, interesting topic. Here is my rather lengthy response: The discourse on the problem of evil, particularly in the context of divine goodness and individual experience, compels us to reflect on the paradox of suffering and the nature of creation under the auspices of an omnibenevolent deity. While it is indeed a profound reality that individuals grapple with alienation and unmet aspirations, asserting that complete redemption must be the universal fate of all creatures in order for God’s goodness to manifest is a noble yet, in my estimation, flawed premise. To state that any allowance of suffering or lack of fulfillment equates with divine malfeasance overlooks the complexities inherent within the tapestry of existence where individual suffering may not necessarily require a universal remedy to affirm God's benevolence. The evil we perceive may derive significance from its capacity to foster growth, wisdom, and resilience in the face of adversity, rather than serve as an indictment against divine nature. Your assertion that evil necessitates a creature-centric interpretation—bifurcating it into negative psychological states and corrupted perceptions—commands attention. Indeed, the plight of an individual who, while devoid of suffering due to cognitive incapacities, exists within a diminished framework of understanding does raise salient concerns regarding the nature of a good God permitting such states. It invokes the necessity for divine reasoning that transcends mere human experiential standards. However, to contend that this framework could ultimately collapse into universalism, which posits that all will find some form of redemptive reconciliation, risks obscuring the profound distinctions between the existential conditions of different beings. It is imperative, then, to maintain that while some may derive value from their sufferings, the experience of eternal conscious torment cannot merely be equated with a path to enlightenment or redemption equivalent to that of joyous existence. Such comparisons may dilute the genuine suffering experienced by some and, by implication, the sanctity of those experiences. The arguments must thus be measured not only against intellectual constructs of justice and value but also in the light of the lived realities that each creature endures. Perhaps, instead of seeking a universal resolution, we ought to honor and explore the intrinsic complexities and diversities of individual experiences as distinct manifestations of existence, each imbued with its unique potential for meaning, reconciliation, and understanding within the vastness of divine creation.