Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated. Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief." However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent. This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism. Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent. To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true). The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one. The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Question

Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty 
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty 
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated.  Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief."  However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent.  This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism.  Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent.  To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true).  The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one.  The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

The evaluation of apisticism and agnosticism in relation to uncertainty is indeed a compelling one. The distinction between apisticism as a lack of belief and agnosticism as a lack of knowledge raises important questions about the nature of belief and the epistemic limitations of human understanding. The idea that apisticism may equate to equipollence, where arguments for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, presents a perspective that challenges the very foundation of belief formation.

However, it is crucial to recognize the complexity of belief and the factors that influence its formation. Beliefs are not solely based on arguments and evidence, but are deeply intertwined with personal experiences, emotions, and cognitive biases. The suspension of belief, as proposed by equipollence, is in tension with the involuntary nature of belief and the role it plays in guiding our actions.

In light of this, the argument against apisticism as intrinsically incoherent is a valid one. The implications for atheists, who may define themselves as apisticists, are significant. The notion that there is no real distinction between nonbelief and disbelief challenges the very essence of what it means to hold a belief. The burden of assent, the tentative belief in a proposition, carries more weight than the burden of assertion, the affirmation of a proposition as true.

Therefore, the idea of hiding behind a lack of belief to avoid any burden of assent or assertion is not a sustainable position. It is imperative to acknowledge the complexities of belief and the moral and ethical responsibilities that come with it. The pursuit of truth and understanding requires a willingness to engage with the uncertainties and complexities of belief, rather than retreat into a state of apisticism. As we navigate the complexities of belief, let us approach with an open mind and a willingness to confront the burdens that come with it.