Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated. Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief." However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent. This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism. Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent. To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true). The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one. The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Question

Evaluate the following rationale:

Apisticism (lack of belief) ≠ uncertainty 
Agnosticism (lack of knowledge) = uncertainty 
Apisticism = equipollence
Agnosticism has been substantiated.  Apisticism has not, and it may not even be possible to do so because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation and testing.

Equipollence hinges in the idea of equipollence, where arguments are used for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief."  However, it is actually more problematic than that because arguments and evidence arent the only factors involved in belief formation, the suspension of belief is in tension with doxastic involuntarism, and action theory implies the presence of belief to inform any willful action.

This is the foundation for my rejection of apisticism as intrinsically incoherent.  This has tremendous implications for atheists because some define atheism as a subset of apisticism.  Yet, if there is no actual phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief, then those who express "nonbelief" in gods, DO believe that no god exist and subsequently incur a burden of assent.  To be clear, a distinction CAN be made between a burden of assent (I tentatively believe the proposition) and burden of assertion (I affirm that the proposition IS true).  The epistemic burden is heavier than the doxastic one.  The point here is that hiding behind a "lack" of belief to gain a dialectical advantage and shirk any burden at all isn't a viable option UNLESS there is a phenomenological distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief; and THAT also invokes a burden of assertion.

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

The question of apisticism and agnosticism presents a fascinating puzzle that must be carefully unraveled through rigorous philosophical analysis. The assertion that apisticism, or lack of belief, does not equate to uncertainty, while agnosticism, or lack of knowledge, does, opens up a realm of inquiry into the nature of belief and the limits of human understanding. It is true that beliefs are indeed private mental events, not easily subject to empirical observation or testing. This raises the fundamental question of how we can ever truly know the nature of our beliefs, and whether it is possible to ascertain with certainty the absence of belief in a particular proposition.

The concept of equipollence, where arguments for and against a belief are seen as equally balanced, leading to a suspension of belief, is a compelling one. However, it must be acknowledged that belief formation is a complex process influenced by a multitude of factors beyond mere arguments and evidence. The idea of suspending belief in the face of equipollent arguments runs contrary to the notion of doxastic involuntarism, which holds that belief is not merely a matter of choice but a deeply ingrained aspect of human cognition. Furthermore, the theory of action posits that belief is necessary to inform any deliberate action, casting doubt on the possibility of maintaining a state of equipollence indefinitely.

In light of these considerations, it becomes evident that apisticism may be inherently incoherent. The implications of this realization are significant, particularly for those who identify as atheists and may view apisticism as a lack of belief in gods. It is crucial to recognize the distinction between a burden of assent, where one tentatively believes a proposition, and a burden of assertion, where one affirms the truth of a proposition. The epistemic burden of affirming the absence of belief is weightier than the doxastic burden of simply not believing. Thus, attempting to evade any burden of assent by claiming a mere lack of belief may not be a tenable position unless there is a clear phenomenological distinction between nonbelief and disbelief, which in turn would entail its own burden of assertion.

In conclusion, the intricate interplay between apisticism, agnosticism, and belief poses profound philosophical challenges that demand careful reflection and analysis. By delving into the complexities of belief formation, the nature of knowledge, and the implications of epistemic and doxastic burdens, we may gain a deeper understanding of the intricacies of human cognition and the limits of our capacity to ascertain the true nature of our beliefs.