To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark of being bad qua man (and not merely, say, qua craftsman or logician)-that what is needed for this, is required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians. But if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of "obligation," of being bound or required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root; and if the word "ought" has become invested in certain contexts with the sense of "obligation," it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis and a special feeling in these contexts.

It is as if the notion "criminal" were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten. A Hume discovering this situation might conclude that there was a special sentiment, expressed by "criminal," which alone gave the word its sense. So Hume discovered the situation in which the notion "obligation" survived, and the notion "ought" was invested with that peculiar force having which it is said to be used in a "moral" sense, but in which the belief in divine law had long since been aban- doned: for it was substantially given up among Protestants at the time of the Reformation.' The situation, if I am right, was the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the framework of thought that made it a really intelligible one. (“Modern Moral Philosophy,” page. 6).

(a) explain the core idea that Anscombe is expressing in the above passage.
Anscombe suggests that even if the source of the moral obligation disappears, the power of the language of it would stay.

Then (b) provide a critical analysis of Anscombe’s idea: Explain whether you think Anscombe is correct, and why.

Question

To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark of being bad qua man (and not merely, say, qua craftsman or logician)-that what is needed for this, is required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians. But if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of "obligation," of being bound or required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root; and if the word "ought" has become invested in certain contexts with the sense of "obligation," it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis and a special feeling in these contexts. 
 
It is as if the notion "criminal" were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten. A Hume discovering this situation might conclude that there was a special sentiment, expressed by "criminal," which alone gave the word its sense. So Hume discovered the situation in which the notion "obligation" survived, and the notion "ought" was invested with that peculiar force having which it is said to be used in a "moral" sense, but in which the belief in divine law had long since been aban- doned: for it was substantially given up among Protestants at the time of the Reformation.' The situation, if I am right, was the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the framework of thought that made it a really intelligible one. (“Modern Moral Philosophy,” page. 6).

(a) explain the core idea that Anscombe is expressing in the above passage. 
Anscombe suggests that even if the source of the moral obligation disappears, the power of the language of it would stay.

Then (b) provide a critical analysis of Anscombe’s idea: Explain whether you think Anscombe is correct, and why.

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

My dear friends and esteemed audience, let us delve deeper into the profound words of Anscombe on the notion of ethics and divine law. She posits that the foundation of moral obligation lies in the belief in a higher power, such as God, who dictates what is required for conformity with virtues. However, she suggests that even if this belief in divine law is abandoned, the concepts of "obligation" and "ought" remain ingrained in our language and thoughts. It is as if a remnant of a forgotten era still lingers within our moral reasoning, independent of its original source.

This notion is indeed thought-provoking, for it raises questions about the essence of moral obligation and the source of moral authority. Can we truly separate the language of morality from its divine origins, or is there an inherent connection between the two? Anscombe's perspective challenges us to reconsider the basis of our ethical beliefs and whether they can stand independently of religious doctrines.

In my humble opinion, Anscombe's idea holds merit as it highlights the enduring power of language and concepts, even when their original meanings may have been lost. The fact that notions of obligation and moral duty persist beyond their religious underpinnings speaks to the universality of ethical principles. It suggests that perhaps our moral compass is not solely reliant on divine decree, but is rooted in a deeper understanding of human nature and the virtues that guide our actions.

However, it also raises concerns about the potential loss of moral clarity and authority in a secular world. If the belief in divine law diminishes, what then becomes the ultimate source of moral guidance? Can we rely solely on human reason and societal norms to determine what is right and wrong? These are the profound questions that Anscombe's idea forces us to confront, and they challenge us to reexamine our ethical beliefs in the absence of religious mandates.

In conclusion, while Anscombe's idea may seem unsettling to some, it offers a valuable insight into the complex nature of ethics and morality. It prompts us to consider the enduring power of moral language and the role of divine law in shaping our ethical convictions. As we navigate the complexities of moral philosophy, let us heed Anscombe's words and continue to ponder the deep connection between ethics, divine law, and the language of moral obligation.