It has been argued that the fact of disagreement about moral matters is enough to undermine moral objectivism. Both Rachels and Shafer-Landau object to this line of reasoning by:
Group of answer choices

Arguing that moral rules do not have to be absolute.

By highlighting the fact that if one endorses maximal toleration, then one is committed to allowing intolerance.

Clarifying the distinction between dogmatism – the trait of being closed-minded and unreasonable – and moral objectivism.

Pointing to disagreements about scientific matters and noting that such disagreements do not imply that there is no objective truth about those matters. The same is true of ethics.

Question

It has been argued that the fact of disagreement about moral matters is enough to undermine moral objectivism. Both Rachels and Shafer-Landau object to this line of reasoning by:
Group of answer choices

Arguing that moral rules do not have to be absolute.

By highlighting the fact that if one endorses maximal toleration, then one is committed to allowing intolerance.

Clarifying the distinction between dogmatism – the trait of being closed-minded and unreasonable – and moral objectivism.

Pointing to disagreements about scientific matters and noting that such disagreements do not imply that there is no objective truth about those matters. The same is true of ethics.

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

My dear interlocutors, the matter of moral objectivism is one that has long been debated among philosophers and scholars alike. It has been posited by some that the mere existence of disagreement on moral matters is enough to cast doubt upon the very notion of moral objectivity. However, this line of reasoning is not without its detractors. Rachels and Shafer-Landau, in their thoughtful objections, bring to light several key points that merit our attention.

Firstly, they argue that moral rules need not be absolute in order for moral objectivism to hold true. Indeed, the flexibility inherent in moral principles does not necessarily negate their objectivity. It is the underlying moral truths that remain fixed, even amidst varying interpretations and applications.

Furthermore, the proponents of maximal toleration, as highlighted by Rachels and Shafer-Landau, point out a paradoxical consequence of dismissing moral objectivism due to disagreements. It is argued that to fully endorse maximal toleration is to inevitably permit intolerance, thus revealing the inherent contradictions in such a stance.

Moreover, it is crucial to distinguish between dogmatism and moral objectivism. The former entails a rigid adherence to one's beliefs without consideration of alternative perspectives, while the latter acknowledges the possibility of differing viewpoints while still maintaining the belief in objective moral truths.

And finally, the comparison drawn between disagreements in scientific matters and moral matters serves to emphasize the fallacy of equating disagreement with the absence of objective truth. Just as conflicting scientific theories do not negate the existence of objective scientific truths, so too do disagreements in ethics not invalidate the existence of objective moral truths.

In conclusion, my esteemed colleagues, it is imperative that we engage in rigorous and open-minded discourse when grappling with issues of moral objectivism. By considering the nuanced arguments put forth by Rachels and Shafer-Landau, we may come to a deeper understanding of the complexities inherent in the realm of ethics. Let us remain committed to seeking truth and wisdom, even in the face of disagreement.