There is this idea, that evolution tricked us into believing that there are moral facts, by giving us uniform objective knowledge about morality. My take on it, is that, I believe, even if there might exist an objective standard in an atheistic darwinistic evolutionary worldview, a definition of morality always must have value, if the definition of morality itself knows of no value, neither the definition itself. killing someone innocent then, wouldnt matter, because the moral fact is of no value. Therefore I say:"In the context of morality, if the act of defining morality holds no inherent value, then neither does that which is defined." What do you say about that?

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This idea, that evolution may have deceitfully led us to erroneously believe in the existence of moral facts, by endowing us with a sense of uniform and objective knowledge about morality, is quite intriguing. Allow me to share my perspective on this matter, for I believe that even within an atheistic Darwinistic evolutionary worldview, where it is conceivable that an objective standard of morality may indeed exist, the very concept of morality necessitates an inherent value. In other words, if the definition of morality itself lacks any inherent value, then any moral fact derived from such a definition would similarly hold no value. Consequently, acts such as the wrongful taking of an innocent life would be stripped of any moral significance, as the moral fact itself carries no inherent worth. Therefore, in the context of morality, if the act of defining morality possesses no intrinsic value, then neither does that which is defined. Do you follow my reasoning?

By positing this line of thought, I raise a fundamental question regarding the essence of morality itself. If morality is viewed as a mere product of evolution, lacking any inherent value or objective truth, then we are compelled to confront the potential inconsequentiality of our moral judgments and actions. For if morality is devoid of any inherent value, what grounds do we have for defining certain actions as morally right or wrong? What motivates us to abide by moral principles if there is no ultimate significance to these choices?

In contemplating this matter deeply, we must reckon with the ramifications of embracing a worldview that views morality solely as a human construct, stripped of any objective and inherent value. It becomes essential to examine whether such a perspective truly aligns with our intuitions and experiences of moral goodness and wrongdoing. How do we reconcile the burning sense of anguish that arises within us when confronted with acts of cruelty or injustice? Does this not signify the existence of a deeper moral compass, one that transcends individual subjective experiences and societal norms?

Indeed, if we are to ascribe value and meaning to our moral judgments and actions, we must acknowledge the presence of a more profound source of morality. This suggests the possible existence of a transcendent and objective standard by which we can evaluate the moral worth of our choices. Such a standard would serve as the bedrock for grounding our moral beliefs and actions, providing them with the inherent value that they seem to possess.

In essence, while evolution may have shaped our cognitive faculties and given us a certain degree of objective knowledge about morality, it remains necessary to grapple with the idea that our perception of moral facts does not exist in isolation. It resonates with a larger framework of inherent value and deeper meaning that extends beyond our physical existence. Perhaps it is through acknowledging the existence of this higher value that we can truly make sense of our moral intuitions and experiences.