Explain Strawson’s argument. What is an objection that both Frankfurt and Wolf can make against the argument? Which sort of view is more plausible and why?

Question

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

Methinks thou hast provoked me with a subject of great philosophical significance, one that verily engulfs the mind in its intricate labyrinth of inquiry. Let me discourse, then, on Strawson's argument and delve into its essence, for in the realm of philosophical contemplation, the elucidation of such noble concepts becomes an eminent duty. Strawson, in his discourse, posits that morality is inextricably bound to our moral responsibility, echoing the theory of determinism that shackles our human agency. By asserting that our actions are compelled by a vast chain of causation, he seeks to absolve us of blame or praise, holding instead that our actions are but a result of circumstances external to our control.

Yet lo! Both Frankfurt and Wolf, protagonists of moral philosophy, may arise from the shadows of contrary opinions and voice their objections against Strawson's argument. Frankfurt, in his illumination, contests the notion of moral responsibility, arguing that even if our actions are predetermined, our desires and intentions remain authentic. The ability to act in accordance with one's desires, or to have second-order volitions, asserts Frankfurt, is the true measure of moral accountability. Wolf, on the other hand, voices her objection through the lens of a greater spiritual realm, questioning the very essence of responsibility. She posits that moral responsibility cannot merely be reduced to external factors, for in order to be truly accountable, one must possess a genuine sense of selfhood, autonomy, and an innate capacity for moral reasoning.

Now, pray, let us ponder upon which path of reasoning doth hold more persuasion. Whilst Strawson's argument doth resonate with the deterministic paradigm, as influenced by the likes of Hobbes and Hume, it cannot shake off the weighty criticism that Frankfurt and Wolf, in their sagacity, present. Verily, the notion that our desires and intentions are what truly define us resonates with a certain clarity. The ability to align our actions with our innermost desires, regardless of the deterministic tapestry that shrouds them, undoubtedly shapes our embodiment of moral responsibility.

Yet, attaining a clearer vantage point upon Wolf's argument reveals a noble gaze that transcends the mere cravings of desires and intentions. It allows us to grasp the intricacies of our moral responsibility, encapsulated within the realms of selfhood and autonomy. To be truly responsible, one must possess the capacity to exercise reasoned judgment, free from the constraints of external influences. Alas! Wolf's view, with its profound contemplation of the moral landscape, emerges as the more plausible, as it accounts for both the underlying fabric of human autonomy and the intertwining of moral responsibility.

In conclusion, fair gentlemen and ladies, Strawson's argument, though compelling in its deterministic approach, fails to fully encapsulate the multifarious nature of moral responsibility. Both Frankfurt and Wolf, with their cogent objections, shed light upon the depth and complexity of this moral quandary. Whilst Frankfurt asserts the significance of genuine desires and intentions, it is Wolf's profound reflection upon selfhood and autonomy that resonates with a deeper understanding of responsibility. Mayhap, it is this convergence of reason and metaphysics that shall guide us towards a comprehensive comprehension of the moral landscape that envelops our mortal existence.