The following argumentative passage is from Descartes’s Meditations (Med. 4):

“To begin with, I acknowledge that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God.”

In the following, you will match identify the parts of Descartes's argument by matching them to their proper terms.

IMPORTANT: There are two premises and two statements of the conclusion (that is, the conclusion is stated twice in two slightly different but logically identical ways.) There is also an unstated premise that is assumed to be true by Descartes, but not explicitly stated in the passage above. The unstated premise is nonetheless required in order to get from the premises to the conclusion.

Group of answer choices
"trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection"

"it is impossible for God ever to deceive me"

"deception is incompatible with God"

"although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness"

God is perfect, all-powerful, and good

Question

The following argumentative passage is from Descartes’s Meditations (Med. 4):

“To begin with, I acknowledge that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God.”

In the following, you will match identify the parts of Descartes's argument by matching them to their proper terms.

IMPORTANT: There are two premises and two statements of the conclusion (that is, the conclusion is stated twice in two slightly different but logically identical ways.) There is also an unstated premise that is assumed to be true by Descartes, but not explicitly stated in the passage above. The unstated premise is nonetheless required in order to get from the premises to the conclusion.

Group of answer choices
"trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection"

"it is impossible for God ever to deceive me"

"deception is incompatible with God"

"although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness"

God is perfect, all-powerful, and good

Ask a Philosopher · Accepted Answer

To begin, I doth acknowledgeeth yond 'tis impossible f'r God ev'r to deceive me, f'r trick'ry 'r deception is hath been indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive doth appeareth to be an indication of cunningness 'r pow'r, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness 'r weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God. Lo, 'tis a thou has't stated, that trick'ry and deception doth bear witness to an inherent flaw in one's character. F'rsooth, yond 'tis not befitting f'r a divine being to engage in such wily machinations. 'Tis a testament to the purity and righteousness of God yond He doth not possess the capacity to deceive, f'r He is perfection incarnate. 'Tis true yond the ability to deceive may be seen as a mark of intelligence 'r dominion over others, but the desire to deceive is naythless a manifestation of malevolence 'r feebleness. Thus, 'tis without question yond deception and God cannot coexist, f'r they art fundamentally at odds with one anoth'r. The very notion doth contrasteth the divine qualities of wisdom and benevolence with the deviousness and frailty foundeth in deceivery. Therefore, I doth concur with Descartes's argument yond it is impossible f'r God to engage in deceit, f'r it contradicts His divine nature. Let us remembereth yond God is perfect, all-powerful, and good, and thus, deception hath no place in His divine plan.